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THE CONDITIONS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE
CHINESE STUDENT MOVEMENT OF 1989
Forthcoming in Partisan Review, Fall 1989
Echoes of the past figured prominently in the Chinese student movement
of 1989. Students began to take to the streets in growing numbers after the death
of Hu Yaobang, the reform-oriented Communist Party General Secretary who
had lost his post during the repression of the 1986-87 student protest. Dazibao(large character posters) mounted on the walls of Beijing University’s “trian~1e
are&’ listed key dates from the May 4th movement of 1919, China’s first major
student protest movement. The seventieth anniversary of May 4th itself was the
occasion of the second really large march of 1989. 1989 was also the tenth an
niversary of the “democracy wall” movement which had brought the first massive
voice for democratization in post-Mao China. And the anniversaries went on and
on. On May 3 I sat with a handful of graduate students on the Beijing University
campus musing on the fact that their movement, which already was beginning to
make them feel part of a historical struggle, came in the year of the fortieth an
niversary of the culmination of China’s communist revolution in the creation of
the People’s Republic, the 200th anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States, and perhaps most potently of all, the bicentennial of the
French Revolution.
The very scene of this conversation said something about the background
to the protest. Of all Chinese universities, Beijing University is perhaps the one
which feels most familiar to an American. Its campus was originally that of
Harvard’s Beijing outreach effort, and it is laid out with quadrangles, spacious
lawns, rolling hills, and even a pretty lake. No American arriving there would
need more than a moment to realize that he was on a university campus. And in
1989 it looked more familiar than ever. Snazzy ten speed bicycles were cropping
up among the more traditional utilitarian Chinese designs. Students wore polo
shirts with brand name logos splashed across their chests. Men and women
walked hand in hand. One could buy Coke as well as the local orange sodas. Agood number of students had earphones on their heads and “Walkman” stereos at
their belts. Oddly, the first thing that struck me as really unfamiliar was the very
high percentage of students who smoked--even though many favored brands from
my home state of North Carolina.
But there were also subtler changes at work. Beijing University had previ
ously been home to one of my favorite statues of Mao Zedong. In front of a
central building he had stood, his hands clasped behind his back, facing into the
wind, perhaps the wind of change. Though Mao was already dead when I first
visited Beijing University, it hadn’t occurred to me that this statue would have
been toppled by the time I returned. I rather imagined that at worst Mao would
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simply lose his currency, but his statue remain a landmark--a bit like the Confederate soldier on the front quad of my own university in Chapel Hill. Mao’s
statue was a casualty, however, not just of shifting political currents but of adeep-seated ambivalence on the part of young Chinese intellectuals towards theirpast. Not only recent symbols such as Mao but ancient figures of Chinese culture
were subject to attack. Students grappled with the challenge of figuring out just
what it did and should mean to be Chinese even while accepting certain Western
influences and proposing innovations of their own. They had not lost their pridein being Chinese, but it was coupled paradoxically with a humiliation at whatever
seemed to have made China weak in the modern world.
Among the bits of Western influence at work in China, of course, werepartial stirrings of capitalism. When I gathered with my student friends to talk
about the prospects for democracy it was in a privately owned and operated res
taurant housed on the University campus. And though there was talk of inflation
overall, this restaurant drew praise for providing us more good food than we
could eat, and quite enough beer to drink, for the equivalent of a little over a dol
lar a head. Of course even that was an expensive meal for Chinese students who
would ordinarily pay fifty cents or less for a dining hall meal, carrying their own
metal dishes with them, and using a spoon rather than chopsticks because it
meant a single implement would do for soup and other dishes, and because it
wouldn’t fall through a mesh bag.
Around the table, my new friends (I had met only one of the students
there before) praised my handling of chopsticks--a routine sort of compliment for
a Chinese to pay a foreigner. They deferentially asked my opinion of and advice
for the Chinese student movement though I had but recently arrived. Andgradually, after a little prodding, they began to tell me more of what they thought
lay ahead. Some expected real democracy in a year or so, others wondered
whether they would see it in their lifetime. All did think it inevitable, a matter
simultaneously of historical necessity and popular will. They told me that intel
lectuals had a central role to play as conscience of the nation and as source of a
new vision of Chinese culture. They relived inspiring moments from the April
27th march when students had broken through ranks of unarmed military police
to reach Tiananmen Square, revealing the government to be unwilling to enforce
the threats of violent repression it had made the day before. They speculated on
tactical questions: Should the planned May 4th march be the last before a con
solidation of gains or one moment in a rising wave of protest? Would the return
of Zhao Ziyang from North Korea bring them an important friend in power or
end the apparent indecision of the government? How could the ideas of the stu
dents best be spread to other sections of the population? They argued amongst
themselves over theoretical questions. They joked about the danger of repres
sion, laughing at the undergraduates who had made wills before marching on
Tiananmen against government orders April 27th.
Within six weeks, these students would have experienced peaks of ex
hilaration as their movement grew beyond the scale of their short term hopes,
troughs of depression as it seemed to falter, lacking strong leadership or sense ofdirection, and rage as soldiers following government orders killed thousands of
fellowprotesters. By mid-June, some of these students would have fled Beijing to
the relative safety of family and friends in smaller towns. Others would be at
tending hours of political study’ sessions each week, confessing the number of
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times they had joined demonstrations, resisting calls to inform on friends, studying the speeches of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng. All would have been silenced, atleast for the near future.
In this essay, I want to look briefly at some of the underlyinç conditions
which gave rise to the protest movement, then summarize the narrative develop
ment of the six weeks which brought such exhilaration and disaster to China.After that, I will address three questions: (1) what did the protesters want? (2)
what may turn out to be the historical achievement and importance of thisprotest? And (3) what are the limits or weaknesses which inhibited it and will
need to be confronted as Chinese people push for democracy in the future? I will
offer only a brief narrative recapitulation of the movement itself, ~oth because Ihave published a narrative elsewhere and because space is limited.
UNDERLYING CONDITIONS
SUCCESSION CRISIS: Chinese critics of the communist regime are fond of
comparing it to its imperial predecessors, pointing out what they call its ‘feudal’
aspects. This is in some ways a problematic characterization, born largely of a
crude appropriation of the already simplified historical categories of The Com
munist Manifesto. The particularities of traditional China are poorly grasped by
lumping it together with medieval Europe, and feudalism was only an aspect,
however important, of European social organization. It had seemed both a cheap
shot and an analytic error for people to say (as the Taiwanese government was
especially fond of claiming) that Mao was just China’s newest emperor. Blaming
the communist system’s current difficulties on lingering feudalism was also a ver
sion of critical analysis which parts of the government could endorse, as it chal
lenged not their policy declarations but only premature claims of success. Blam
ing feudalism actually shifted critique away from a more fundamental analysis of
the problems in the current regime.
Nonetheless, in 1989 the government did seem to share a good many con
tinuities with traditional China. Students pointed, for example, to the old men
struggling to cling to power. Crises of imperial succession were the bane of tradi
tional China. Because each emperor ruled until his death, nearly every transition
was marked by a power struggle. As a ruler grew old, his generals, staff and
potential heirs beçan jockeying for position, usually creating a period of increas
ing instability which often culminated in a full scale crisis after the emperor’sdeath. Deng Xiaoping had made avoiding this pattern one of his main goals in
the late 1980s. He had maneuvered his fellow octogenarians into full or partial
retirement, elevating a ‘younger’ generation (mainly in its 60s) to power. But
when push came to shove, he appeared unwilling to give up having the final say
on every important policy decision. In 1987 he had engineered the removal of his
long-time protege and designated heir, Hu Yaobang when the later had acted too
independently and with too much willingness to see economic reform extended
into the political arena. Of course he was to do the same in 1989.
Beyond the specifics of Deng’s power, students commented on the average
age of the party elite as itself an indication of China’s failure to modernize. Theyfelt this keenly, as it meant that they would have to wait decades--decades spent
in following the dictates of their elders rather than their hearts or minds--before
3. See “Democracy and Science, 1989: A Report from Beijing,” in Transaction/SOCIETY,
September/October 1989; I have also written on organizational, leadership and tactical considera
tions m~~~The Beijing Spring, 1989: Notes of the Making of a Protest,’ Dissent, Fall, 1989.
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they could have a substantial voice in the highest levels of policy-making. This
was one of the sources of Gorbachev’s popularity. Not only was the Soviet leader
relatively young, he appeared to listen to and promote still younger voices. A bit
of the same had happened in China, to be sure. A few younger economists, espe
cially, had been catapulted to great prominence. A Western graduate education
in some cases helped to overcome youth and give rapid acceleration to a career.
But the role of the party elders was felt as a drag on China’s progress and even as
a source of embarrassment, since it was seen as a sign of backwardness itself.
In the spring of 1989, a few people went beyond raising questions about
the age of party leaders, and beyond wondering about who would succeed Deng.
Perhaps, they suggested, China was experiencing not just a succession of emperors but of dynasties. Perhaps the communist regime would turn out just to be
one of China’s short-lived dynasties, a reign of decades like the Sui or Yuan
rather than of a thousand-years as the traditional benediction has it. Chinese
dynasties are thought to have a natural life course: strong and sometimes ex
panding in their youth, stable and peaceful in middle age, increasingly prone to
crises and instability as they grow old. Was communism growing old?
Most students had little sense that any short term changes were going to
end the People’s Republic of China. The majority did not even contemplate
overturning the Communist Party. They did however see the government as
weakening. And whether the succession crisis was large or small, it seemed toplay a significant role. The ordinary work of the government was hampered byloss of discipline, increasing corruption and the distraction of factional struggles.
The latter were not just between “hard-liners’ and “reformers” but among a wide
range of different groups. While most such groups had ideological positions,
these were not necessarily their basis. Many were constructed out of personal
loyalties, including kinship, while others were marriages of convenience. Al
liances cross-cut each other and boundaries shifted. Little of this struggle went
on in public--or even in the full view of the party elite. While it consumed more
and more attention, thus, it also made even highly placed people more and more
uneasy and uncertain of just what sort of government--and ideological line--would
prevail.
The divisions in government did not all come from the succession crisis, of
course; that merely made it difficult to resolve them or paper them over. Differ
ing views of the economic reforms of the past decade, the struggle among genera
tions, relations between military and civilian leaders, debate over the extent of
permissible Westernization and attempts to stem some of the high level corrup
tion which ran rampant were all factors undermining government unity.
Whatever the outcome, a key impact of the growing concern over succes
sion was the near incapacitation of the government when faced with the growing
student protest and the evident sympathy much of the broader public felt for it.
The movement cannot be understood simply in terms of its own grievances or orçanizational strengths. It has to be seen as flowering in an opening provided for
it by the internal divisions and relative weakness of the government.
MATERJAL GAINS: In the spring of 1989, Chinese people frequently pointed
out the various shortcomings of their economy: inflation was growing, there were
periodic shortages of important products, some goods and services could only be
secured through bribery, wages were inequitable at best and often low in absolute
terms. Students repeatedly bemoaned their own poverty, which was very real by
American standards, and pointed out that even the most senior professors (along
with engineers, doctors and other intellectuals and professionals) made but a
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fraction of what a taxi driver received. At the same time, though the students did
not always recognize it, their material situation was noticeable better than that of
students only a few years before. Bicycles were not a short supply item, though
most students had rather beat up bikes (a couple told me they had left their fan
cier ten speeds at home because they would stand out at the university and be
stolen in Beijing). Most students at the major Beijing universities had radios,
many had stereos, a few had televisions in their dormitory rooms. Undergraduates were crowded four to six to a room, but nearly all ate adequately and
owned a few books. A good many had cameras with which to photograph theirfavorite da.zibao (some had quite fancy Japanese 35mm SLRs); this was a far cryfrom the China of the early 1980s, when a tourist might draw a crowd just by
changing film. Students also had tape recorders to preserve memorable speechesduring the demonstrations and leaders found it easy to buy battery-operated
megaphones to make their speeches audible. In short, even students, who had
not shared much in China’s economic gains of the last decade, were noticeablybetter off than they had been five years before.
The gains were much more pronounced for other groups. There were thegetihu, the small entrepreneurs whose stalls filled free markets and a good many
sidewalks, and some of whom made enough money to be well above manning a
stall anymore. Some, indeed, became quite rich, owners of motorcycles andpatrons of the better restaurants. Of course, some also failed, though this side of
capitalism did not seem to be clear to all Chinese yet, and many assumed that
simply to be an entrepreneur meant to be wealthy. There were the employees ofjoint venture companies from hotels to textile factories to electronics assemblyplants. Nearly all could expect to earn a wage at least double the national
average. Peasants had benefited most famously, largely from the right to raise
some animals and market some crops for themselves. There were also an in
creasing number of millionaires and some well paid senior managers in a growing
‘big business’ sector, like the founders of the Stone Computer Corporation,China’s largest privately owned company, which even operated its own think tank
and publications. Deng Xiaoping’s slogan, “to get rich is glorious” had not been
ignored.
In the last two years, however, many of the gains had been eroded. The
economy had stagnated. Peasants had been paid for their main crops (still pur
chased by the government) only partly in cash and partly in a not immediately
negotiable scrip. Inflation had eaten up much of the extra earnings of urban
workers. The implementation of market prices in some areas while flying to
regulate prices in others was responsible for numerous imbalances. Lightbulbs
were in short supply, for example, because tungsten was sold at (relatively high)
market prices while lightbulbs themselves had to be sold at a low regulated price;firms could not make a profit manufacturing them. In the countryside, the rush
to purchase consumer goods had reportedly slowed. The government scrip and
consequent shortage of cash was not the only reason. Peasants had also begun to
save for traditional purposes such as weddings and funerals. [In July 1989 thegovernment would launch a crackdown on such practices, ostensibly because of
their “superstitious” religious foundations but also substantially because of the
economic impact of holding large amounts of money out of circulation.]
Even though recent years had brought more problems along with
economic growth, the student and popular protest of Spring 1989 cannot be un
derstood without noting that economic gains were genuine. Firstly, many of the
popular complaints, including most notably corruption, inflation and inequities in
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income distribution, were products of the economic reforms. Secondly, the
economic changes helped to propel the more general opening of possibilities inChina. Economic motives had helped to engender growing Western influencesthrough tourism (hard currency), joint ventures (capital and technology), and
education abroad (skills). Beyond this, economic reforms had fueled a burgeoning market in publications, for example, and a sense that opportunities to ad
vance one’s career were not limited to currying favor with the Communist Party
or one’s immediate supervisors (though there were still sharp limits to how freefrom one’s danwei or unit one could become). Thirdly, and centrally, the very
economic ambitions of the Party and government made them newly reliant onhighly educated workers, professionals, scientists and scholars.
A NEW PROMINENCE FOR INTELLECTUALS: A very wide range of edu
cated people are categorized by the Chinese term translated as “intellectuals.”Not only people who live by creating, criticizing or disseminating knowledge, but
nearly everyone with a university education is considered an intellectual in China.These were people which Deng Xiaoping and other proponents of economic
‘modernization’ realized they needed. This realization had to contend, however,
with the ambivalence which the leadership of the Communist Party and for that
matter the people of China had always shown towards intellectuals.
In the first place, intellectuals were respected in traditional China as
masters of Confucian thought, calligraphy and classical Chinese style. At the
same time, scholars were either local gentry or imperial bureaucrats or both.Westernization perpetuated this ambivalence. Intellectual ranks grew, but the
role of many intellectuals as purveyors of Western culture made others uneasy.The struggle to respond to the challenge of Western economic and militarypower helped to rouse reform-oriented intellectual movements which might be
seen as the first stirrings of the formation of a nationwide intellectual class independent of the government; on the other hand, the official intellectuals of thebureaucracy by and large proved themselves inadequate to the challenge of
reforming their own administration and strengthening China. Thousands of intellectuals returned from study abroad to help build a new China after the 1949
revolution. Most, however, were treated with suspicion from the start and attacked repeatedly in campaigns of rectification and anti-rightism and ultimately
the Cultural Revolution. Though Mao himself was an intellectual of a sort, aproud author of classical poetry, he was unwilling to encourage similar occupa
tions in others.
Deng Xiaoping, by contrast, had fewer intellectual pretensions but was
much readier to grant intellectuals an important place in Chinese society. As the
main agent in ending and undoing the Cultural Revolution he was deeply reveredby many Chinese intellectuals. Students told me in 1984, for example, how hehad personally saved them from bleak years of working with (and in some casesbeing tormented by) the peasants, how he had brought a large dose of
meritocratic decision-making to a university admissions process which had beendominated by political, class and other non-intellectual criteria. Hundreds ofprofessors had been restored to their senior university positions; writers had been
able to publish again; scientists returned to their laboratories.
But as the 1980s and the reforms progressed, two partially correlated ten
sions began to develop. The first was a split between intellectuals of two different sorts. On the one side were technocrats who worked in engineering,demography, econometrics or other applied sciences to fly to make China’s mod
ernization happen. On the other side were more “humanistic” or “cultural”
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scholars whose concern was increasingly with what they perceived to be the ab
sence of a real vision of what it would mean to be Chinese in this era of reform.
The government, of course, was much more interested in the first group, many
members of which made astonishingly rapid rises in the academic hierarchy. This
left the second group not only more concerned than ever for China’s soul and fu
ture direction, but more and more unhappy with its own position and level of influence.
The second tension was with the government itself. As intellectualsgained in stature and numbers, they began to gain confidence and to push for fur
ther liberalizations or even to attack the government. Scientists as well ashumanists were in the forefront of this; one of the most visible figures was the
astrophysicist and university administrator Fang Lizhi. But a central role wasplayed by writers, literary scholars and others who engaged in a massive rethink
ing of China’s history and culture. Some, like the prominent journalist Liu
Binyan, tried hard to stay within the bounds of party loyalty; others did not.
Fang Lizhi and other dissidents spoke directly of democracy and civil
liberties. Many cultural thinkers addressed the sense of national humiliation,
lack of direction and “malaise’ they identified in China. Both sorts of writings
and teachings helped to pave the way for the student protest movement. In the
minds of many students they blurred together. Democracy was not just apreferable form of government but the symbolic answer to China’s wounded cul
tural pride and economic backwardness.
By 1989, students’ attention was focused in this as in other areas on the
negative. But it does need to be noted that a genuine liberalization had taken
place. The repression of the 1986-87 dissent had been mild. Publishing was still
far more open than it had been during the first three decades of the People’s
Republic. Above all, it was partly because there was an increasingly vital intellec
tual life in China that students began to see more urgently a role for themselves
and more senior intellectuals as guides and consciences for the country.
The student protest movement of April to June began with a central focus
on issues of concern to intellectuals. In a sense, it was part of a process of intel
lectual class formation begun at the turn of the century, pushed forward espe
cially in 1919, and interrupted by the communist revolution. The student protest
movement eventually made connections to a much wider range of people,
however, through its condemnation of corruption. And people whose concerns
were primarily economic nonetheless responded to the students’ initiative in confronting the government. At its core, however, this remained a student move
ment, framed primarily in terms of the specific concerns of intellectuals, espe
cially such civil liberties as freedom of speech, publication and assembly. These
were sought not just out of selfishness, though, but out of a sense that China
needed the advice which intellectuals had to offer.
NARRATIVE
The immediate occasion for the movement was the death of Hu Yaobang
on April 15th. Hu had been head of the Communist Party during the last
Chinese student protests of 1986-7, and had been dismissed for not controlling
the movement more forcefully. This had made him a sort of martyr to the move
ment, even though he was by no means an advocate of everything the students
had stood for. Rather, somewhat like Zhao Ziyang, he was simply a reformer
and a proponent of changes which depended on the good will and participation ofChina’s intellectuals. Hu was not mourned with a deep outpouring of sentiment,
like Zhao Enlai; rather, his death provided a pretext for demonstrations which
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had their roots elsewhere. Students carried pictures of Hu, and no doubt there
were sincere regrets at his death, and some suspicion about its causes (he died of
a heart attack during a politburo meeting) but the signs are better understood aspart of a carefully aimed message for Deng Xiaoping and the ‘hard-liners’ of theCommunist Party.
As students took to the streets in growing numbers after April 15, this
message was heard quite clearly by Deng and the other leaders. Students were
telling them they disapproved of their leadership and particularly of their failure
to listen more to students and intellectuals. The pictures of Hu disappeared from
the student demonstrations, for the most part, after May 4. The messages of dis
approval and the demand for a public voice became ever stronger.
May 4th itself had been touted as a major demonstration, but though large
it was lacking in novelty and drama. There was neither the confrontation of the
27th nor the focal point of hunger strikers or statue of liberty. Before these were
introduced, the movement went briefly into low gear. Students returned to
classes for a week, celebrating their success and waiting to see what the govern
ment would do. The government offered a dialogue with Yuan Mu, spokesman
for the Council of State. This was an achievement, because the government was
not in the habit of discussing policy issues with students or other non-officials, let
alone of televising such discussions. But Yuan Mu was not very senior, rather too
smooth for most tastes (partly because he was a better TV performer than his
interlocutors), and unwilling to get very deeply into what the students considered
the key issues.
Things started to heat up again with the start of the hunger strike (May
12-13) and Gorbachev’s visit (May 15-18 in Beijing). The largest of all the
demonstrations was held May 17th, with more than a million people crowding
Tiananmen Square and lining the approach roads. At midnight on May 19th,
after Gorbachev had left for Shanghai, the government declared martial law, with
Li Peng making the announcement in a particularly poorly delivered (and
received) speech. Ironically, student leaders had that very evening decided to
end the hunger strike; some were even calling for withdrawing from the Square.
Had the government waited a few hours, confrontation might have been avoided.
That it occurred is testimony to the lack of communication between the two sides.
As heavy news coverage showed the world, the imposition of martial law
was a failure. Troops were met on the periphery of Beijing by “ordinary people”(laobaixing) who took it upon themselves to act as citizens rather than the
government’s masses. As the story was repeated by surprised and deeply moved
students, it seemed that in every neighborhood it was an old woman who placed
~herself in front of troop trucks, saying they would have to run over her if they
were to move against the protesting students. Buses and bicycle barriers were
drawn across the road to make barricades; troops were at least unwilling if not
precisely unable to move forward against such opposition. Having been kept in
the dark about the nature of events in Beijing and apparently the purpose of their
own maneuvers, they seemed bewildered and chagrined by the popular resis
tance. They were greeted as friends by the crowds, but denied privacy and subjected to never-ending “education” about the current situation.
From May 20th to June 2nd, to live in Beijing was to ride an emotional
roller-coaster. Popular participation in protest ebbed and flowed. At first,
people stayed up all night on barricades, waiting to defend the city against the
army. The Paris Commune sprang not only to my mind but to those of locals,
especially older ones who had read a bit more Marx than today’s students, Of
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course people grew tired, and the immediate military threat seemed to pass.
Rumors spread of both popular victory and an immanent crackdown; a military
coup and a siege of the city. As the apparent stalemate continued, eyes turned
towards the internal power struggles of the government. Would Zhao Ziyang
lead reformers to a new and secure dominance? Or would the old guard and its
proteges like Premier Li Peng oust the others as too sympathetic to students,
capitalism and the West? As crowds shrank, the movement looked to be weaken
ing. Leaders discussed, as they had before, the possibility of unilaterally declar
ing victory and putting the strategic ball back in the government’s court. They
could not reach agreement on this however, perhaps because there seemed no
way to withdraw from the Square without appearing to have weakened or lost
resolve. On May 26th the erection of the Goddess of Democracy’ statue gave
the movement a new focal point and new energy.
By this point also, students from outside Beijing had come to outnumber
those from the cities own universities in the occupation of Tiananmen Square.
And much of the time, especially in the final couple of days before the massacre,
students of any sort were outnumbered by other people, mostly young male
workers, many (I am told) unemployed. These gave the crowd a much surlier
tone, and greatly diminished the student activists’ ability to maintain order and a
peaceful response to military provocation.
New troops had been brought to Beijing; the rumor spread that they were
from Inner Mongolia and spoke little or no putonghua (‘conmon people’s
language’, Mandarin, or standard dialect). Be that as it may, those face to face
with students outside Zhongnanhai compound or the railroad station showed
little interest in talking--or in being harangued by the protesters. The govern
ment succeeded in getting a substantial number to at least three locations in
proximity to the Square: Zhongnanhai (the capacious official residence of most
top party leaders, though these had apparently left Beijing during the period of
attempted imposition of martial law), the central railroad station, and the old
Imperial Palace museum--the Forbidden City. On the mornings of June 2nd and
3rd troops went jogging around the Square and otherwise advertised their
presence. Later on the 3rd, a few thousand advanced on the crowd, but without
firing guns. They were repulsed with light fighting; skirmishes continued
throughout the day. Tear gas was used at least once, at the gate to Zhongnanhai,
but certainly not widely. Troops beat protesters with belts and truncheons; the
crowd fought back with limbs pulled from the trees along Chang’an Boulevard.
Though violence never entirely subsided, the troops were kept at bay (to what
must have been their growing frustration) and the conflicts were confined enough
that families came out to enjoy a popsicle and the entertainment the fighting of
fered. Around 7 p.m., I myself bought a crepe from a street vendor less than
three hundred yards from a barricade behind the Great Hall of the People where
troops still challenged protesters, occasionally flailing away with their belts.
Around 8:30 that night, troops quartered in the Southwest of Beijing
began to move towards Tiananmen Square. They encountered strong resistance
along Fuxingmen and Chang’an Boulevards (different sections of the same
street), especially in the Muxudi district about two miles from the Square. They
fired on demonstrators and drove their vehicles into crowds and over barricades.
Occasionally, when a tank was stuck struggling over a bicycle barrier that had
been pulled into the road, protesters ran out and stuck iron bars into its tracks;
those which were disabled were often torched, usually after the occupants had
been given a chance to escape (though this did not necessarily spare them a
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beating). From the best of eye witness accounts it seems that thousands had al
ready been killed before these troops, or the other column moving in from the
East, reached Tiananmen Square. There the advancing troops were joined by
those from the Forbidden City in completing a route of the remainder of the oc
cupying students and other protesters.
For two days after this massacre, students and other citizens moved about
in a state of shock. Some retreated to their homes. Others scurried about the
town flying to get a clearer sense of what had happened. Hospitals were over
flowing with wounded. Sporadic shooting continued. Throughout an unusually
hazy Sunday afternoon and much of Monday, columns of smoke rose from burn
ing vehicles; occasionally an explosion indicated that another had been set alight.
We were all uncertain what would happen next. The possibility of civil war was
discussed, particularly as it appeared that the 38th army might oppose the 27th
which had perpetrated the massacre. By late on the 7th it was clear that this was
not going to happen. The government began to recompose itself, the ‘hard-liners’
and their associates to consolidate their victory over more liberal Party forces.
The writing of an official history began with the transformation of soldiers
who had died during the invasion into martyrs. It was variously declared that no
students had been killed or that the number was small; carefully phrased state
ments indicated that no one had been shot in Tiananmen Square; dead protesters
were described as hooligans, thugs and troublemakers, not students. Pressure
was placed on the public to identify and turn in protest leaders who had gone into
hiding, and ordinary people who had been identified as telling foreign reporters
what they thought had actually happened. At least once of these has since been
convicted of “rumor-mongering” and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.
Never has the Orwellian imagery of 1984 seemed more apt. China has both ver
sions of Winston Smith: those who send historical knowledge down the ‘memory
hole’ in the service of bureaucratic truth, and those who try to keep alive the
simple message that two plus two equals four. This movement has blessed the
latter with first-hand knowledge among a much wider segment of China’s urban
population, and with a much more substantial documentary record, though this is
primarily held abroad and not currently available to the Chinese people.
WHAT DID THE PROTESTERS WANT?
The 1989 student protest lasted only six weeks. Though its roots were old,
and some of its ideas had been under intensive discussion for months, its peat
accomplishment was massive mobilization, not theoretical deepening of Chinese
democracy. Protesters pursued essentially three sorts of goals: democracy,
economic improvement and an end to corruption. The three were not equal
priorities for everyone, however. Democracy was the main concern of university
students and intellectuals, but not of most workers. Ordinary people were more
interested in economic issues. Complaints about corruption were shared widely
in both groups.
When students talked about democracy, they often disappointed Western
ers who expected them to place multiparty elections at the top of their priorities.
But though many students thought such elections a good thing, civil liberties
loomed much larger in their immediate vision of democracy. They were strug
gling for freedom of expression through speech and the press, freedom of associa
tion, especially in their independent students’ association, and ultimately for agreater freedom in conducting the affairs of their own lives. As budding intellec
tuals, they sought to carry on a discourse about the future of China and especially
to offer the government advice and have the government listen.
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Democracy was spoken of I thought, more as something that people
might have, than as something people might do. That is, democracy meant having
a government which took the interests of its people seriously, acted to theirbenefit rather than that of its cadres, listened to expressions of popular opinion
and was fair in its dealings with ordinary people. The idea of democracy as aform of political participation was much less well developed. The crucial par
ticipations which the students’ sought to guarantee were extensions of the tradi
tional idea of officials’ (and to a lesser extent ordinary people) remonstrating
with the emperor, holding him to his responsibilities and telling him what he
needed to know in order to be a good ruler. Thus a greater role for intellectuals
was central to their vision of democracy. We in America sometimes emphasize
the role of elections to the point of forgetting the importance of social move
ments and other less mechanical forms of democratic participation, particularly
in determining which issues will be on the agenda of policymakers and behind the
decisions made in elections. Chinese thinkers have often pointed to both the
weaknesses of electoral democracy in the West and the problems of reliance on
elections in a backward, under-educated country. Students implicitly postponed
universal suffrage elections to a later stage, after popular consciousness had been
raised. They tended to conceive of education as something which they as intellec
tuals would do to the people, rather than as a direct outgrowth of a participatory
political process.
As to the ordinary people, they certainly declared themselves to be infavor of democracy when asked. But if pressed as to their grievances they would
stress economic issues and corruption. They wanted an end to the inflation which
ate away at the purchasing power of their relatively fixed salaries. Though not
high by third world standards, this inflation was unprecedented in the People’s
Republic of China. People also talked about a rationalization of the distribution
of wealth. The government had implemented reforms which enabled some
people to get rich, and had praised the idea of getting rich, but had not offered a
broadly understood rationale for why some would enjoy this opportunity and
others would not. Why should entrepreneurs become millionaires and doctors
not? Why should taxi drivers make several times the income of engineers? Why
should teenagers lucky enough to get jobs in a joint venture hotel make more
than the most senior university professors? In short, the economy seemed to lack
order; its results did not make sense to ordinary people. This may well have un
settled them even if growth were continuous and inflation non-existent. Butgrowth had stagnated during the last two years, while inflation grew substantially.
At one level, of course, people simply wanted more wealth, but they also wanted
the distribution of wealth to make sense. The Party had abandoned the extreme
but clear egalitarianism of its earlier policies, but not come up with a new
legitimating message. In one sense this was ironic, for it is not clear that the
popular perception that inequality had increased was accurate. The rise of rural
incomes relative to urban had probably reduced overall inequality during the last
decade of reform. But changing relations among economic sectors, and the
visibility of new displays of substantial wealth, made people feel inequality
acutely.
The sense of economic injustice merged with the complaint of corruption.
There were several senses to this complaint. First there was the radical extension
and transformation of the traditional reliance onguanxi or connections. Here the
issue was not just that people relied on connections more, but that these connec
tions were becoming commodified, reduced to cash transactions. It had always
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been easier to get an airplane ticket, say, if you knew someone with a relative in
the airline’s office. Now people claimed that seats were being held back by
strategically placed clerks so that their relatives could act as brokers. Moreover,
the payment was cash on the spot, not the expectation that the favor would be
returned (perhaps to one’s kin, not one’s self) or the satisfaction of not being a
debtor in this system of cultural credit. The traditional idea of connections wasgiving way to simple bribery. By far the most frequently complained about ver
sion of guanxi was the placement of high party officials’ children in the most
desirable jobs. It seemed no accident that both Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng had
sons working as executives on Hainan Island, one of the new enterprise zones;
nearly everyone assumed that these youn~ men not only had good jobs thanks to
their fathers but impunity from prosecution as they skimmed money from local
ventures.
This crossed the border to the second form of corruption which involved
much larger transactions. It was practiced by official units as well as private
businessmen. It involved a variety of under the table quid pro quos--padded
payrolls, attempted price manipulations, toleration for inferior quality cement in
return for a bribe, demanding foreign exchançe certificates for work which should
have been paid in domestic currency. This kind of problem corresponded to that
with which people the world over are unfortunately familiar. It is hard to know if
its extent was unusually high, though everyone seemed sure that it had grown.
The high proportion of government businesses made it likely that more of this
kind of shady antics would be seen as official corruption rather than simply un
savory capitalism.
The government’s economic role also produced the third sort of corrup
tion, a kind of semi-benign version of the second. The policy of reducing but not
eliminating detailed central economic planning created a variety of imbalances.
Vital goods might be in short supply in one region while another had an excess,
but either documents or cash for any transaction was lacking. A number of
businessmen moved into the breech as black market deal makers, fixers who
helped overcome the contradiction of the system. They might organize a barter
arrangement which linked three regions each with too much of something
another wanted. They might arrange the sale of a good at a price triple the offi
cial one, with only the controlled price reported. Though people resented the
fortunes made in this• way, this was not the sort of corruption on which they
focused. They did, however, tend to see the whole mercantile practice of buying
cheap and selling dear as shady in much the same way.
One of the problems the protest movement might have faced had it not
been crushed was to develop an analysis of China’s current situation which would
link the democratic concerns of students to the more narrowly economic ones of
other people. It is not obvious that democracy by itself will lessen corruption,
though the student had faith that it would. It is not obvious either, that a
democratic transition in China could be managed without serious economic
problems--an issue the student leaders had not really addressed.
LIMITS AND WEAKNESSES
As exhilarating and unexpected as the success of the student protest move
ment was, it is important to recognize some of the issues which were inadequately
faced and problems which remained unsolved. The first and most important was
simply that this was a movement of urban people with almost no resonance in or
connections to the countryside. This is not to say that China’s rural population is
without grievances or uncritically supportive of all government policy. It is not.
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But word of this protest spread in the countryside much less extensively than in
the cities, and primarily through official government media. It is still the case
that few peasant children go to universities, and so the informal communications
network which spread unofficial and ‘insider’ views of the protest did not work ef
fectively in rural areas. Links between students and peasants also were inhibited
by class bias. Students in the April 27th march shouted to soldiers: “Farmers gohome; you have no business here.’ Farmers in China as elsewhere have
suspicions about “city slickers.” Moreover, some of the complaints and interests
of urban and rural populations pitted them at least superficially against each
other as consumers vs. producers. Higher food prices (even in the form of an end
to the scrip payments by which peasants were forced to loan money to thegovernment) would have furthered the inflation which worried urban folks.
Students and urban workers found conunon cause in the protests, but this
should not obscure the fact that few organizational linkages united them.
Though the ideas of sending delegations to visit factories, or of forming a joint
student-worker committee, were sometimes mentioned, little action was taken on
this front. The split between political and economic goals made creation of such
linkages particularly important. Occasionally activists mentioned the model of
Poland’s “Solidarity” movement. This was a popular idea, but it faces several
hurdles in China. Solidarity was rooted in stronger, more independent workplace
organizations than exist in China. It was enhanced by linkages between intellec
tuals and the workers’ movement in which the intellectuals did not completely
pre-empt the leadership positions. Polish society, as suggested previously, had
more social arenas free from close state supervision than China. And in China
there was no institution like the Polish Catholic Church to link together urban
and rural populations.
The student movement was also hampered by some internal difficulties.One was a weakness of decision-making capacity. Western reporters (like theChinese government in the course of its repression) often exaggerated the role of
centralized leadership in organizing the movement. Leadership, however, was
very diffuse. Different contingents of demonstrators acted with some autonomy,
guided by constant observation, of each other and lateral flow of information as
by any directives from a hierarchy of top leaders. This did not prevent a high
level of organization in the protests, but it made certain difficult decisions almost
impossible to make and implement. This became especially apparent during the
occupation of Tiananmen Square.
The occupation had provided the movement with a setting at once neutral(not any one campus) and central. It became a forum for discourse, and every
night leaders met to discuss tactical and logistic issues. But those discussions
were hampered by a problem almost endemic to student movements--the attempt
to make decisions by consensus. This became a major issue when proposals to
withdraw from Tiananmen Square began to be put forward by the most
prominent leaders of the movement. Accounts differ on whether majority
opinion actually favored staying when Wu’erkaixi, Wang Dan and Chai Ling were
voted down May 21st, or whether a substantial minority simply indicated that it
would not leave. In any case, it was clear that a complete and orderly withdrawal
could not be achieved. For a rump occupation to be left behind could only
weaken the movement, and so the students stayed (ostensibly all of them, though
in fact a good many simply drifted away until the statue of the Goddess of
Democracy rekindled enthusiasm a few days later). On all sorts of occasions dif
ferent student groups spent hours in debate about the right course of action, with
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little clear mechanism for making decisions and moving ahead. I had to remind
myself that they had not been ingrained with the two hundred years of experience
of majority votes which has made that procedure almost second nature to us.
Closely related to this was the fact that the students generally did not have
a strong conception, still less a habit of, pluralistic public discourse. They favored
pluralism in the sense that they wanted their voices to be heard and not squashed
by the government. But internally the felt a strong need to speak unanimously.
They sought to be the “voice of the people” and understood themselves as speak
ing ideally for the country as a whole. They did not consider that there might be
competing but equally right views of a situation or solutions to a problem.
Though they tried to respect minorities, they did not see the nurturance of an in
ternal discourse across lines of significant difference as itself one of the goals of
their movement. As a result, student activists occasionally complained that
movement leaders behaved towards them just as the government behaved
towards the people. Certainly leaders made no systematic effort to ascertain the
views of ordinary movement participants. They reached their own conclusions,
announced them, and then hoped that they would be followed. When they were
not, they felt abandoned and tended to withdraw.
Finally, the movement was weakened by its lack of communications
media. This was both an internal problem and especially a limit to the
movement’s ability to reach the country as a whole. Most information flowed by
word of mouth. Students used telephones and printed handbills, but they did not
have their own newspaper or journals. For an exhilarating week in mid-to-late
May the Chinese newspapers and TV began to report events as they happened.
The BBC and Voice of America broadcasts were a crucial source of news on
China. But the students lacked the capacity to disseminate very widely their own
version of events in Beijing. And equally they lacked the institutional capacity for
an internal discourse beyond the face-to-face level. Though some student groups,
sensitive to the historic importance of these events, tried systematically to keep
archives, the movement did not generate directly a mass of documentation. Jour
nalists and other observers, overseas Chinese, and activists who escaped will play
the .most important role in recording what went on. This is a key advantage to
the government in its effort to rewrite history--or rather, to write it with an eye
not to accuracy but to the best didactic message.
HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE
Ironically, it is perhaps easier to sum up the movement’s accomplishments
than to note its weaknesses and limits. Certainly it feels better. Future move
ments will have to contend with the issues this one found difficult to resolve. But
whatever its shortcomings, the student protest movement of 1989 did score star
tling successes.
It will play a continuing role in Chinese history, I think, simply through the
inspiration offered by the scale of protest. This will be augmented by the sense
that workers and students and intellectuals found a sense of common cause.
Moreover, the growth of the movement and the failure of the government’s initial
attempt to impose martial law combine to show that the Chinese government is
not all-powerful. However severe the government’s repression in the coming
months, the movement revealed that the government could suffer at least tem
porary weakness and vulnerability. Ideological and factional disunity, the im
minence of a succession crisis, and the absence of a clear vision of where it
should head all made it hard for the government to take effective action. People
will look for such opportunities in the future.
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The success of the movement showed also that however ‘totalitarian” the
Chinese government might aspire to be (and the label fit the first three decades
of the PRC better than it fit most of Eastern Europe) it did not succeed com
pletely in removing the distinction between state and society. Even in 1976 and
1979-80 some dissenting public action had been possible. In 1989, after a decade
of reform, the action was of enormous magnitude. It is unlikely that all the in
stitutions which have begun to emerge as civil society’s basis for a public sphere
will be eliminated during the current repression. Indeed, the dominant factions
in the government seem intent enough on pursuing economic modernization(however much it may wish to minimize the possibility of accompanying political
change) that it probably will not even try.
Finally, the effects of repression itself should be chalked up to the historic
importance of the student movement. By finding it necessary to act with such
force, and to turn back much of the progress of reform, the government revealed
the weakness of its own position. Quite likely this weakness stemmed largely
from internal divisions. Whatever its source, it led the dominant factions in
govermnent to abandon a decade’s worth of image polishing, not only abroad but
at home. The ferocity of the massacre has acted powerfully to de-legitimize the
Chinese government. Perhaps almost as significantly, the People’s Liberation
Army has been tarred with the same brush. Until the very end of the protest, stu
dents chanted “the People’s Liberation Army loves the people, the people love
the People’s Liberation Army.” Over and again I was told, “the army will not fire
on the Chinese people.” This is a message the people will not find it easy to
believe again.
The Chinese government has found it necessary to rule its own capital city
and the elite of its own children substantially by force rather than consent. This
does not mean that its grip on the nation as a whole is so weak that its demise is
imminent. It does mean that its legitimacy and strength are seriously damaged.
It will have to repair them, or govern less, or devote more resources to the mere
maintenance of control.
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